Continued Rise of Evils identified as Culprits of the 2008 Crash

1. In 2008, in the wake of the financial crisis, assets under management in so-called "retail alternative funds" in the US [a.k.a. alternative investments, and defined to include absolute return, commodities, currency trading, dedicated short bias, equity energy, leveraged strategies (both long and inverse), managed futures, market neutral, multi-strategy alternatives, natural resources, options arbitrage, precious metals, real estate and volatility strategies; but to exclude distressed debt] crashed in the US from $368Bn to $275Bn. However, as a percentage of "all long term retail fund AUM" [defined to include mutual funds, closed-end funds, ETFs and UCITs (Undertakings for Collective Investments in Securities) structures, and excludes limited partnerships and separately managed accounts], it never fell - indeed, the figure of $275Bn in 2008 was 5% of LT Retail Fund AUM in 2008 whereas the bigger figure of $368Bn was 4% of the same figure in 2007. 
2. From 2009, the share of alternative investments as a percentage of the all long term retail fund AUM started rising once again, boht, in the US, and globally excluding the USand they have been growing @21% CAGR in absolute terms in the US, and at 11% globally excluding the US;  till 2011.
3. At the same time, several other disturbing parameters have been heading in the "wrong" direction. See the table below, which shows these statistics as they stood  at three different times I have tracked them in my blog. 
4. Reading this table closely shows that the average American is on the right path (reduced personal debt per citizen; higher GDP per citizen) but the US Government has continued its profligacy with a vengeance (rise in National Debt as % of GDP; Total Debt per Citizen; and US Debt held by Foreign Countries). Just look at the US Total Liabilities and US Interest Burden per citizen from April, 2010 to September, 2011 to see what havoc the US fiscal and monetary policies are wreaking.   
5. What is worse, the investment bankers are back with a vengeance: as paras 1. and 2. above indicate, and as the figure of Currency and Credit Derivatives in the Table below confirm, what Warren Buffett famously termed as Weapons of Financial Mass Destruction are growing in value at an uncomfortable pace.  Derivative exposures have risen by as much as $91 Trillion (or 6.37 times the US GDP in just 30 months), when they should have been falling! 
6. It is time that the US Investment bankers are stopped from selling "innovative" risk-masking derivative products - for the sake of the financial health of the entire world.

Table 1

Parameter	8 Apr 10	26 Jul 11	11 Sep 12
US National Debt as % of US GDP	89%	98%	104%
US National Debt per citizen ($):	41,381	46,619	50,959
US GDP per citizen ($):	46,381	47,488	48,805
US Total Debt per citizen ($):	1,80,484	1,76,113	1,81,307
US Personal Debt per citizen ($):	53,787	51,441	50,132
US Interest Burden per citizen ($):	1,493	11,664	12,343
US Total Assets per citizen ($):	2,34,181	2,43,086	2,96,124
US Total Liabilities per citizen ($):	3,50,054	10,26,974	10,54,522
US Gross Domestic Product ($):	14.333 Tr	14.809 Tr	15.342 Tr
US Debt held by Foreign Countries ($):	3.875 Tr	4.584 Tr	5.376 Tr
Currency and Credit Derivatives ($):	648.975 Tr	611.499 Tr	740.277 Tr

Sources of data: 

Para 1 and 2 above: from "The Mainstreaming of Alternative Investments - Fueling the Next Wave of Growth in Asset Management", a Report by the Financial Services Practice of McKinsey & Co, Sep 2012.

Para 3 : extracted on 11 Sep, 2012 from www.usdebtclock.org,

Table 1 above: extracted on dates mentioned in cols 2-4 of table 1 from www.usdebtclock.org,  

Dexia Bank Collapse: What it means for Europe, Belgium and the World

Dexia Bank is among the Top 50 financial institutions in the world. It is not just some small, unknown bank. It is different from other banks because it, and with it, Belgium, are caught in an uncomfortable spot. How? Let me attempt an explanation.

1. Belgium has external debt to GDP ratio of close to 100% already. The Government thus does not have room for manouevre to fund losses of Dexia. That's already been done once - in 2008, the Belgian Government took control of Dexia. Various arms of Belgian and French Government now hold over 50% in Dexia. This closes off one source of succour. Worse, there is a political standoff in Belgium because of which there is no functioning Government at all at present in Belgium! Worst time for such problems to hit.
2. Dexia's leverage at present is estimated to be almost 60:1 – double that of Lehman Brothers when its collapse was triggered. So Dexia is not in pretty shape at all. Worse, of its over €500Bn of assets, €20Bn are debts of Portugal, Italy and Greece, all of whom are in need of bailouts.
3. After the 2008 takeover by the Government, instead of getting better, things got worse, because Dexia was a source of funds for the various parts of Belgium's Government. When they took it over, instead of stopping loans to Government which were the major part of its NPAs, they stepped up lending to Government, which enabled the Government to reduce its fiscal deficit somewhat. Now, if the Government were to bear even a small part of the losses of Dexia, its external debt to GDP ratio will shoot up to almost the level that Italy is at currently (which is 134%). So PIIGS will no longer be a sufficiently comprehensive acronym of European states in deep fiscal trouble. We have to find some way of adding a “B” to it. Just for comparison, US, Australia and India are at 99%, 94% and 22% respectively. France, one of the co-owners of Dexia, is at 208%.
4. The only time-tested solution for banks or financial institutions in such a mess as Dexia finds itself in is to break up the institution into a “good bank” and a “bad bank” - like India did for Unit Trust of India a decade or so ago. Usually, the bad bank sells the 'bad” assets for anything they can get for it – which could be single digit percentages of the book value. In Dexia's case, this is apparently not feasible because (a) Belgium's Government does not have the money and the political will (there is no functioning government now!) to bail out Dexia because it would mean choking its own source of funding; and (b) “Good bank” assets have not takers almost anywhere in the world today. So the good bank-bad bank solution will not work very well for Dexia. But that is the only solution – so you can expect sell-offs of any saleable assets.
   
   
   Already, Reuters reports Qatar as being interesting in buying out Dexia's Luxembourg business. So the dismembering of the Bank has officially begun. The vultures are circling, but then, there aren't too many vultures, this time. Trading has been suspended in Dexia's shares, and S&P has downgraded Dexia's group companies steeply. In its downgrade press release, it notes that there is negative revaluation reserve in respect of available-for-sale securities of almost €6.9 Bn. Moody's has followed S&P in steeply downgrading (by 3 levels) the sovereign rating of Italy, and also some Italian banks in the last 2 days. Besides, 12 UK banks and 9 Portuguese banks have also been downgraded. Sovereign ratings of Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus have been cut as well. From the US, Ben Bernanke has said that the US economy is close to faltering. Deutsche Bank has warned that it will miss its profit target.
   
   
   One must remember that failing banks are not just like manufacturing or services companies that fail. Banks, as they fail, tear asunder the transaction enablement capability of its citizens. Thus, slitting the banking system's throat is akin to slitting the underbelly of a crocodile – however strong the economy may otherwise be, the banking system is its weakest link. This, all the above news in just a few days is bad news indeed, for the entire world. When banks collapse, other businesses will follow, and depositors will panic, causing a financial logjam in not just those countries, but in all countries where businesses have business ties with enterprises in countries whose banking systems are collapsing.
   In India, our very own SBI has suffered a downgrade because of its low Tier-I capital level that would require it to raise money and/or ask for Government help/ support. So where is the good news? If at all, it is in India where the Government has both, the wherewithal (with some difficulty) and the will and inclination, to support its banks.
   PostScript: This is the text of an email I received. Makes for interesting reading.
   Uncertainty has now hit Japan. In the last seven days, Origami bank has folded, Sumo Bank has gone belly up and Bonsai Bank has announced plans to cut some of its branches. Yesterday, it was also announced that Karaoke Bank will go up for sale and will likely go for a song, while shares in Kamikaze Bank were suspended today after they nose-dived. While Samurai Bank is soldiering on after sharp cutbacks, 500 staff at Karate Bank got the chop and analysts report that there is something fishy going on at Sushi Bank, where it is feared that staff may get a raw deal.

Re-visiting Modern Accounting Standards

Should acquisition cost of an asset depend on how it is financed?

To my mind, and to most non-accountants, the simple answer seems to be No. But that is not how modern accountants see it. Costs incurred (including interest) till the time an asset is ready for use is treated as part of the cost of the asset. Whatever compulsions may have been behind adoption of such a treatment as standard, it tends to militate against simplicity, and creates needless (in my view) complexity.

Can a company have Net Profit After Tax equal to double its turnover for a quarter?

Common sense tells us that this is impossible. How can profits exceed turnover, that too profits after tax? However, modern accounting is not all common sense. Or maybe, it is such highly developed common sense that it takes truly uncommon levels of sense to understand why this can happen. As it happens, there are several reasons why this can happen. Deferred Taxation Accounting (DTA) is one of the reasons. DTA is one more area where accounting has been made dreadfully complex. So much so that it creates situations occasionally as the one described in the question above, where quarterly Net Profits After Tax of some companies exceed even quarterly revenues! How can accountants explain to laymen this paradox – where, say, the quarterly turnover of a manufacturing company is Rs.50 crores and its NPAT is Rs.90+ crores? Most accountants trying to explain this situation will end up tying themselves and their listeners in knots. This happens in the relatively rare instance when a company has just turned the corner after several years of losses. One argument in favour of the currently favoured treatment of deferred taxes is that it makes clear the differences in expected tax provision on reported profits, and the actual tax provision. However, we lose sight of the fact that the net result of the income statement becomes almost impossible to understand, even to reasonably financially literate individuals. Surely, this could not have been the intent of introducing such accounting treatment!

Is it a bad thing to allow retired employees medical treatment for life in hospitals run by the company?

Certainly, one cannot fault managers in Tata Steel if they begin to think like this. Accounting for Employee Benefits is another area where accounting complexity has reached ridiculous levels (in my view). Tata Steel used to routinely allow their retired employees and their families to be treated in the wonderful hospital they have built in Jamshedpur; and absorb and meet the net losses or cash shortfalls of that hospital quite routinely, as part of its employee-friendly initiatives. Let us say their costs were Rs.30 crores per annum, give or take a few crores. When AS 15 was made mandatory, suddenly they realized that because they allowed their retired employees and their families to enjoy these facilities for life, they suddenly had to recognize the present value of all the costs they expected to incur over the next several years, as a cost in a single year. This resulted in a hit to their Income Statement to the tune of hundreds of crores in the year in which the new Standard was made mandatory (if I remember it right, it was over Rs.250 crores). Why? Could not well enough be left alone? Now, it has accountants and managers thinking closely about the impact of such facilities to its past employees on its current profits, way beyond the actual cash expenses of offering such facilities. Simplicity flies out of the door, to be replaced by dreadful complexity. What I wonder is, what purpose is served by such complexity?

Why did Warren Buffett call derivatives "weapons of financial mass destruction'?

Buffett should have included "securitised, structured products" which are a class of "innovative" derivatives, by the same appellation. We know now that derivatives and securitisation have made financial life, and accounting for the new-fangled "innovations" they spawned infinitely more complex. Banks in the developed world are still facing the consequences of the complex accounting legacy of the millions of securitised structured note transactions it entered into almost without thinking in better times. They are now realising the impact of all that complex accounting – it only passed the parcel of risk onto others. It did not eliminate risk. Ultimately, every bank in the developed world was left holding such risk parcels to varying degrees. But they did not simply pass on risk to others. Some structured products passed on risks to a distant tomorrow.

We have yet to see the complete impact of such contracts that, in addition to passing the risk around to different people, also passed the risk to a future date. There are several apparently innocuous deals and assets sitting on the books of several companies (not just banks) which represent accounting legerdemain of pushing losses off to a point of time in the distant future, so that the current management came out smelling like roses though their results should have had the faecal matter hitting the overhead rotating cooling device. They are the financial equivalent of mines in modern warfare. They will go off and claim the lives of innocents at any time in future, without warning. This is because several best-selling "structured products" designed by mathematical geniueses sitting at investment banks the world over, were designed to hide losses from shareholders, future management and regulators alike. We have yet to see the full impact of such deals. Liabilities under such contracts will crawl out of nowhere, as it were, and trouble future managers and bankers alike. This is the long-term legacy of allowing untramelled financial innovation. AS 30, 31 and 32 (collectively dealing with accounting and reporting of derivatives) is something that almost 90% of practising Chartered Accountants – those charged with implementing them and checking their implementation incompanies, will privately admit to not being comfortable with. I think these Accounting Standards is a gigantic case of GroupThink – the management phenomenon where even a unanimous decision taken by a Group is completely at variance with what almost all of those participating in taking the decision privately think and opine. We need the small boy who points out shrilly that the Empe3ror is not really wearing clothes!

Why should we bother about all these complexities?

Almost all the modern accounting standards that have contributed their bit to making accounting more complex and less understandable have behind them the objective of making a company's Balance Sheet more "realistic". What they have actually succeeded in doing is to make the Income Statement almost impossible to understand or predict. Why should one prefer Balance Sheet accuracy to Income Statement accuracy? I think that the Balance Sheet showing assets at unrealistic low values based on historical cost is a form of desirable conservatism in accounting. We have succeeded in making the Income Statement, which is a good indicator of how well a company is being run, almost too volatile to be of any use – whether to compare results with past years, or to compare results with those of peers. Therefore, what I make above is a case for a complete re-thinking of the basis of modern, fair-value based accounting, and slowly going back to the traditional historical cost based accounting.

Algorithmic Trading - Why Indian Stock Markets are Endangered

A few months ago, I had blogged about tight coupling in financial markets. In that entry,I had explained at a micro-level the impact of algorithmic trading. Given below is a "macro" story about how high-frequency trading in securities using computer programs played a big role in (though I would stop short of saying that they caused) a violent fluctuation in shares' and securities' prices on Wall Street last year. In less than 15 minutes, the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index plummetted and lost almost 6% of the opening value - and then recovered almost all of it in the next 15 minutes.

What happened on May 6, 2010 on Wall Street?

Major equity indices in futures as well as securities markets, already down 4% from the earlier day's close, suddenly plummetted a further 5-6% before recovering equally quickly, all in minutes. This affected almost all the 8,000 securities and ETFs in similar manner. Over 20,000 trades were reported to have been transacted at prices 60% from their prices just a few moments earlier.

Why did this happen?

At 2:32 pm, on an already volatile day, Waddell and Reed Financial Inc (not named by the joint CTFC-SEC report dated Sept 30, 2010, but named by many news reports) started a computer program to sell 75,000 E-Mini futures contracts worth close to $4.1 Bn. This was programmed to sell at any price and time, so instead of an orderly sale over a few hours, it sold this huge quantity of contracts within the space of 20 minutes, accelerating the sales as prices fell.

What actually happened during the crash?

The contagion spread to the equities market when arbitrageurs noticed the growing gap between the equities and futures prices. A significant finding is that 6 HFT (High Frequency Trading) firms (i.e., firms that extensively used algorithmic trading) remained active in the market even during the crash period of a few minutes. A blow-by-blow account follows:

• Five minutes into the crash, at 2:37 pm, data feeds from computers groaning under the huge numbers of contracts, started slowing down, leaving both, exchanges and investors uncertain about where share prices stood.
• The NASDAQ went into “self-help mode” at 2:37 pm where the transactions were not routed through NYSE's Arca electronic trading platform. CBoT and BATS exchanges (BATS at 2:49 pm) followed and also went into “self-help mode” which means that trades on NASDAQ, CBoT and BATS did not need to honour an Arca quote from NYSE.
• By 2:40, some trading and market-making firms started pulling out, due to algorithms that pause when they sense large price movements that could be due to questionable data feed. This left the market short of ready buyers and sellers. Apple, for example fell by $23 in 2 minutes, with the buy-sell spread going up to $5 instead of a few cents.
• Volumes of E-Mini contracts that normally mimic the S&P 500 surged but liquidity dried up. As a result, at 2:45:17 pm, E-Mini prices plunged 12.75 cents in half a second. This set off a circuit breaker that halted trading for 5 seconds.
• As individual stocks declined as much as 10%, ETF traders started withdrawing from the market.
• Then, at 2:46, even more strange things started happening because of the sheer speed difference between trades being put through and displayed – P&G shares were offered for purchase at prices higher than offered for sale! This is never supposed to happen in an electronic exchange.
• At 2:47, Dow reaches its nadir for the day, down 998 points or 9.2% from the opening level. Accenture, trading minutes earlier at $40, was offered at 1 cent.
• Then, at 2:49, the Dow rebounded by 300 points in 1 minute.

• There were no takers for ETF shares – iShares S&P500 Value Index Fund traded for 11 cents. But the broad recovery continued. By 2:58, indices reached the level they were at 2:30 pm.
• At 3:01, almost a half-hour to the minute since the crisis began, NASDAQ snapped out of its self-help mode and resumed routing orders to the Arca trading platform.
• At 4 pm, the DJIA closed 340 points below its previous close.

The Joint CFTC-SEC investigating committee reported that several HFT firms they interviewed had algorithms that took trading decisions based on direct proprietary data feed from the exchange directly rather than on consolidated market data, to reduce “latency” or delays measured in milliseconds. These algorithms went awry when the data feed from the exchange slowed down. Those HFT firms that did not depend on direct feeds for trading decisions got contradictory feeds that led to unease in taking decisions. Yet others that were not concerned with data latency in milliseconds simply withdrew from the markets.

The HFT firms that depended on their algorithms for trading decisions were not affected by the “self-help” declarations of NASDAQ, CBoT and BATS, and continued to rout orders to these exchanges. Therefore, the “self-help” declarations were ruled out as a cause of the volatility.

While no clear single cause was pointed out, HFTs using algorithms to trade rapidly (in one documented case, 200 trades exchanged hands 27,000 times in 14 seconds) were commonly thought of as the villains. It must be said, though, that there have been spirited defences by algorithmic trading experts, who point (among other factors) to volatility when markets are closed (ie difference between closing prices and opening prices on next day) as the real villain of the piece – on the logic that overnight differences can only be caused by humans, who are prone to panic unlike computers.

Even so, the SEC has since instituted a system of circuit breakers to arrest rollercoaster falls like the one experienced on Wall Street on May 6, 2010. This is another lesson that they have learnt by experience – instead of simply looking eastwards and learning from Indian bourses.

What can we learn from this?

But now, the stage has come to re-learn from our own wisdom. Algorithmic trading is now allowed on Indian bourses. Reports have suggested that over 40% of all trades are done by computers on NSE and BSE. Add to it the other dangerous fact - that FIIs that invest "hot money" that can fly out of the country in seconds account for over 70% of all floating stock (ie, stock that gets traded on the bourses).  See this in juxtaposition with the often displayed behaviour of FII fund managers who, like a herd of sheep, make a beeline for the two exits (NSE and BSE) for their investments at the merest sniff of danger anywhere in the world (even if it does not endanger their holdings in India), and it becomes clear that we have set up our bourses for spectacular volatility where securities' prices falling off a cliff in minutes will become sickeningly regular occurrences.

BofA reacts to an article that says things remarkably similar to what I wrote 13 days back!

On August 10, I wrote about Bank of America, and headlined my blog entry with the words, The Death Spiral beckons ... . I then wrote a follow-through piece, on  August 16, highlighting the gathering storm clouds around BofA. Then, I attempted to put what I wrote about BofA into perspective for Indian readers of my blog, by explaining how serious the situation of BoA was, really, for itself and for the US economy, and indeed, for the rest of the world. 

On August 23, Henry Blodget, a former Wall Street analyst and currently CEO of Business Insider, an online financial news and views publication wrote about Bank of America. Blodget has cited many more figures - and exaggerated at least two, according to Bank of America's official Press Release. But Blodget exulted, 'Oh My Goodness: Now Bank of America is blaming its Collapsing Stock on Me!' He admitted that BofA was right about one of the two points of rebuttal, and updated the article to reflect the correct figure.

Why do I write about Blodget and BofA? I think I may have just influenced what Blodget wrote. Of course, it is entirely likely (and probably true) that Blodget arrived at the same conclusions as I did on his own. But that cannot obfuscate the fact that the substance of what he wrote on August 23 is remarkably similar to what I wrote in the three pieces referred to above. He even uses the same phrase - the death spiral - in his piece. Now, that is a coincidence, indeed!

Imitation, it is said, is the sincerest form of flattery. I should feel flattered indeed, except that

(a) Writing about BofA pained me, but when elephants flail around, ants get trampled. So I thought a warning was in order, to point out something the bank was hiding behind accounting opacity. Now, I have no illusion about being so well-regarded that BofA or the US economy or Wall Street would take note. But then, through Henry Blodget, exactly that seems to have happened!

(b) When what (in my view) is almost inevitable happens, those who took evasive action to the extent they could (after understanding what I, or for that matter, Blodget, had to say) will have me to thank in a small measure. That is the only moral justification for predictions of financial doom (which have a disconcerting habit of being self-fulfilling these days) in writing. What makes me puke is that Blodget is enjoying the discomfiture he is causing BofA.

Of course, Blodget has not cared to acknowledge that he has read my blog and been influenced by what he wrote. But then, how will he know that my blog had more readers in the United States than in India in the week upto August 16? (you need to be logged into Facebook to see that link).

Blodget probably thought he was the only guy in the US who read it. But then, even after being in the online news business, I am sorry that he has not fathomed the power of the Internet.

Now to Bank of America again - their Press Release  reproduced here defends itself weakly by talking of its tangible book value per share as of June 30. This is a non-GAAP measure by BofA's own admission in its Balance Sheet (read the footnote to my death spiral writeup). GAAP means Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Non-GAAP measure thus means, by definition, not a generally accepted accounting measure. If you read what BofA wrote about Goodwill, the only figure I concentrated on in the death spiral blog entry, you will realize that BofA knew it was on tricky ground there.

Ratings are rotten - proof from an insider

Earlier, I had written about the fact that rating agencies' methodologies were suspect - "Rating agencies will have to revisit their sovereign rating norms. Currently, it is unthinkable in their models to question the rating of AAA to the US".
Now, there is proof from an insider that the rating agency Moody's was utterly compromised and conflicted.  This 78-page Comment on SEC Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations makes for shocking reading, though it confirms what we had always suspected - that conflict of interest permeated all levels of this "Nationally Recognized" rating organization. It is a must-read for those trying to understand how the crisis of 2008 could have happened, and the role of rating organizations in this crisis.

Putting the Bank of America situation in perspective

What would you think of the state of the Indian economy, if what I said of BofA and Citibank was said of State Bank of India and ICICI Bank in India by some economist of repute? 

The situation is that serious for the US and for many countries in Europe, where the nation's top banks have dug themselves into deep holes that not even the EU or their respective Governments can afford. All these economies have their underbellies exposed.

On both continents, banks are hiding behind accounting gobbledygook called Impairment and Fair Value Accounting. But the understanding is filtering through. Tonight (in India) brought news of a blood bath on bourses in the US and Europe. So tomorrow (19th August) will almost certainly see a bloodbath on Indian stock exchanges - as FII Fund Managers make a beeline to the nearest exit. Expect a fall of at least 400 points in the Sensex on 19th August, 2011 before short covering enables a partial recovery.

I believe that this is the beginning of the unravelling of several economies in Europe and of the US economy as well, with them slipping into R-2, needing QE-3 and possibly QE-4.

I shall write again tomorrow to report whether what I said about the bloodbath on Indian stock markets was accurate. I feel comfortable making these gloomy predictions because I currently am sitting on cash, having (fortunately) believed in my own predictions and taken my own advice!

Tight Coupling of Financial Markets

Nassim Nicholas Taleb made famous the concept of "tight coupling" to explain why there were sudden, interlocking failures in different markets or sudden crashes in prices of securities.
A recent example highlights and illustrates this problem beautifully. An obscure book on genetics of a fly, The Making of a Fly, created a record on Amazon.com when the price quoted for a used copy of this out-of-print book went up to beyond $23 Mn (shipping $3 extra) as recently as in April this year! (At the time of writing, the price was down to $65) 
What happened? 
Apparently, two booksellers who listed this book as among their offerings, had an algorithm (i.e., a computer program) that quoted the price of the books, esp. used books, they offered for sale, so that the price that was quoted was never very far from the market price. Quite independently, the algorithm both used took, among other things, the price quoted by the other as a benchmark, and raised it by about 10%. So, effectively these algorithms competed with each other to set a higher price! It is easy, knowing this, to understand how this caused the price to spiral beyond reason. With no human being checking the price quoted, the price soon went beyond the dictates of reason, with no stopper!
Exactly the same thing happens in stock markets as well. This is especially true in the so-called High Frequency Trading (HFT) firms. Today, well over 70% of the trades by volume as well as value in the US are carried out by HFT firms' computers that initiate orders based on information received electronically, before human traders can even read and process the information they observe, leave alone decide and implement the decision. 
Algorithmic trading, or algo trading, or simply black box trading, is also used to divide large trades into several smaller trades in order to manage market impact, and risk. Sell side traders, such as market makers and some hedge funds, provide liquidity to the market, generating and executing orders automatically. Algo trading is also used almost every investment strategy for market making, arbitrage, or pure speculation (including trend following). That is the "good side" of algo-trading.
It is very common for traders to also put in "stop-loss" limits in algorithms - the point to which, if the price falls, a sell order at market is implemented. This is intended to cap the downside of any bet taken. However, there is a major side-effect of this: When prices are falling, when stop-losses are triggered, the number of shares being sold sharply rises - which results in the prices falling further, which then sets off a fresh wave of stop-loss orders ... and so on, till you have a price crash that nobody can stop, because it all happens faster than the human mind can comprehend and act on! This is analogous to how we get pile-ups on high-speed superhighways, but much lesser scale of accidents on very crowded roads.
That is the reason why, today, sudden single-day (or even single-hour) falls in several markets all over the world are unsettling, but alas, not infrequent occurrences.
In the next few days, I will be writing more on algorithmic trading. Look out for more!

How Schools in Denver were cheated by Bankers

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Here is another sordid story of bankers' greed -- where they sold sophisticated structured products to a School Board who lacked the expertise to assess the risks of such a product realistically -- while the bankers laughed all the way back to their offices!!
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It's deja vu all over again!

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We saw what Nick Leeson did to Barings Bank. We have also seen how a Japanese brokerage house was brought to its knees by a single trade where the quantities and rates were mixed, in Japanese yen!

We now have the strange, bizarre case of Steve Perkins of PVM Oil Futures who bought 7m barrels of crude past midnight from a laptop at his home while in a drunken stupor. He accounted for 69% of all oil futures trades between midnight and 4 am on June 30, during which time, the oil prices rose by $1.50 within a 30-minute time span!

As Yogi Berra said, it's deja vu all over again!
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An ancient parable with modern characters

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A dear friend of mine, Kiran Sreedharan, pointed out a great piece by Aadisht Khanna. AK says that this old  parable of "the weaver and chariot maker is one of the Panchatantra stories that usually doesn't make it to primary school textbooks or Amar Chitra Katha, mostly because it's full of sex, war, and moral hazard".
Like most really great stories, this one is a cutting commentary on recent events in the US financial markets, and rip-roaringly hilarious because it is so true. Only, we are looking at that truth through the goggles of an old parable. 
Aadisht writes a very interesting blog at wokay.in  However, in my view, this ancient parable with modern analogies is something that puts most of his blog entries in the shade. 
PS: 8 Mar, 2011
This page seems to have moved, but I found the same parable here. Obviously, this is an un-attributed lift, because this blog entry is dated after the date of this blog entry of mine. 
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More on ULIPs - esp NAV Guarantee

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In this entry, I had done a round-up on the ULIP SBI vs IRDA controversy, quoting a few experts. One of those experts, Jayant Thakur, commented on one aspect of my entry on which entity takes up the downside of the NAV guarantee, and what is its capital adequacy. He pointed out this article to me.  Inter alia, this article points out that the way the guarantee is managed is that if the NAV spikes on any day, enough of the portfolio is transferred to debt to cover the guaranteed NAV on maturity. This struck me as very unfair to the investor.

 Most ULIP brochures (here is an example) include words to this effect:

There will be an additional charge for the cost of investment guarantee of 0.10% per annum. These will be made by adjustment to the NAV.

This actually is the opposite of what advertisements make out implicitly -- that the risk and cost of the guarantee is being borne by the insurance company, whereas they are charging the investor every year. This sentence was what made me think in the first place that perhaps there would be a third party backing up or taking the downside for the guarantee, in return for a fixed charge, similar to bond insurance premia charged by monoline insurers in the US. Till I saw this sentence in the above-referred example ULIP brochure:

If the NAV of Pinnacle Fund falls below allowable limits, assets will be completely reallocated to debt.

If the guarantee is to be implemented by shifting from equity to debt as the article suggests, (and also what the above example brochure suggests) then it is insult added to injury added to dishonesty. Why so?
(a) It means they are charging the investor for what the fund managers already have the right to do, viz. invest any part of the portfolio in debt. That is Insult.
(b) It means that when the going gets tough, switching to debt to contain the fallout of the guarantee is a "poison pill" that the fund manager forcibly makes the investor swallow, because it lowers the expected rate of return dramatically and reduces NAV fluctuation dramatically too. It also means that the fund managers have virtually abdicated their fund management function. That is Injury.
(c) Switching to debt predominantly to de-risk and cap NAV guarantee liability means hardly any equity exposure left. Why should the investor pay a higher fund management charge on the now specious argument that investing in equity being riskier justifies a higher risk management charge? Worse, the fund reserves the right to increase the fund management charge to 2.5% per annum [being almost double of what they are charging today (1.35% in the example)]. All this when the investment risk is borne by the investor! That is Dishonesty. It is also Unfairness.
If, on the other hand, the guarantee is being implemented by passing on most or all of the guarantee cost to a third party, then the questions raised in my earlier blog entry remain relevant.
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Regulatory Turf Wars: SEBI v IRDA

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Generally, turf wars are a bad thing. However, in this case, I am totally on SEBI's side. 

See the SEBI order here.

I have examined ULIP scheme after ULIP scheme, only to find in the fine print that the fees and charges levied by the insurance companies are so high as to be unconscionable. For example, at the end of a three-year lock-in period, even if I assume an average return of 20% per annum on money invested, I find that the NAV of the units the investor is entitled to will be barely equal to what the investor has paid in. In other words, for 3 years, the insurance company effectively confiscates all returns on investments to the extent of the first 20% per annum at least. If the return is lower than that, the investor swallows the loss, even though he has parted with a fat fund management charge every year.  

I was also sure that the commissions paid on these schemes must be very high, because none of the agents I contacted offered me a tax-saving MF scheme (ELSS) instead (mostly, insurance agents also double up as agents for MF schemes) when I expressed my dissatisfaction. Hence, I eventually preferred a bank deposit with a 5-year lock-in at 7.25% per annum compounded assured return, that also gave me the tax benefit I sought. The hook in the ULIPs is that the highest NAV over 7 years is guaranteed. The fine print here is that you have to be locked in for that whole period (at least 7 years) and the premium paid every year to insure the risk of paying out amounts exceeding the NAV on the redemption date are paid for by the investor. No skin off the fund manager's or insurance company's nose! I would like to be enlightened on which entity insures this risk., and what their capital adequacy to cover this risk is.

If MFs can make do with much lower asset management fees, with a better governed (chinese walls between AMC and Trust, separate Boards for both, etc) investment management structure, with more sensible incentive structures (no front-end commission, agency commission paid over the life of the MF deposit) I cannot see why insurance companies should be an exception to this. Especially because the insurance risk is kept to a very low figure -- for example, the insured sum does not exceed, in single payment schemes, twice the premium. In other schemes where premia are paid over several years, the insured sum cannot exceed 5 times the annual premium. In any case, linking it to the premium paid is mere semantics -- because what is being paid is nothing but an instalment of an SIP, with a minuscule proportion of the payment being diverted for insurance cost, the fig-leaf that enabled insurance companies to market ULIPs on flagrantly different terms than an MF is allowed to do. 

The biggest factor helping the insurance companies is the huge size of the market, and the sheer number of investors who would lose money if the ULIPs were banned with immediate effect -- a lot of what they have paid would just disappear, having been paid to cover sales and marketing costs, various upfront and recurring fees and charges, and the costs of unwinding if it becomes necessary. The unfairness of this would have to be balanced against allowing continuance of such hopelessly one-sided schemes. Fait accompli should not be allowed to be a defence or a consideration in the decision arrived at.

Several experts have lauded this order from SEBI. 

• Jayant Thakur, for example, asks why the ban should not be extended to endowment schemes too, because obviously nearly 90% of the premium paid goes towards the investment corpus, if we compare it with term insurance schemes.  
• Sandeep Parekh expresses a similar sentiment as I have expressed in an earlier paragraph.  
• Ajay Shah has acclaimed SEBI's order for breaking the silo-like thinking of regulatory verticals -- where the IRDA regulates insurance companies, though ULIPs are predominantly investment products, and not insurance products. He also writes in today's Financial Express, exposing 3 common fallacious arguments against SEBI's intervention.
• Vivek Kaul writing in DNA, exposes how less the proportion of insurance really is in different ULIP schemes -- approximately 1.1% of multiple premium schemes, and 0.6% of single premium schemes, if equivalent term insurance policy rates were applied to the amount of insurance cover extended.
• Suniti Ahuja Kohli, writing in the Indian Express, points out that whatever the decision maybe, at the end of the day, it is the policyholder who stands to gain the most. She also goes on to trace the chequered history of ULIPs.

Keep your eyes peeled on this turf war. While we should regret regulatory turf wars, this kind of a war is far preferable to the kind of war seen a few years back in the US -- where both, the SEC and the CFTC eagerly disowned jurisdiction over derivative instruments like CMOs and CDOs, and the nvestment bankers made merry till the economy and the risk bubble they built up imploded.

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Is SBI's foray into general Insurance wise?

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A few days back, I criticised LIC's intention to get into banking.

Now comes a report that, to top its foray into Life Insurance, SBI intends to enter General Insurance business before end of April, 2010. They have already been recruiting managers for this venture for the last 10 months, and are almost ready to launch.

The same logic and criticism applies to SBI's joint venture with Insurance Australia Group too. It is bad enough that they have ventured into Life Insurance. This makes it worse, in my view. Why?

Banking and Insurance are the two most risky businesses worldwide, and involve two completely different challenges. Insurance companies have to deal wisely with a surfeit of liquidity (usually) and banks have to constantly manage threat of liquidity shortfalls. Combining both reduces the strength of the combination to overcome threats and severe demands on liquidity that affect both industries. The recent global recession is an example of a threat to both industries simultaneously. Enough financial pundits (Nouriel Roubini, Nassim Taleb, et al) have predicted that this could happen again, and in our lifetimes.

We in India escaped the impact of the global crash because of three major factors: 

1. Our financial institutions were just not allowed to invest in derivative securities and there was consequently hardly any significant secondary market trading in debt securities;
2. Our banks had a very significant liquidity padding (SLR/CRR) that was nearly absent in the first world; and 
3. Our banks were not major players in any part of the banking business, and our insurance players were similarly almost absent in the banking sector.

Now the situation is set to change -- in the name of development and liberalisation. 

Banks are getting into insurance, and insurance companies are getting into banking. This in my view magnifies the riskiness of both businesses, and does not diminish it. I am not even talking of conflict of interest here, which can also rise considerably.

There is constant clamour for reduction in SLR/CRR, which, in my view is nothing but an operating profit cushion against the banking industry's inability to extract risk-adjusted returns on their lending and assurance intermediation (L/Cs, Bank Guarantees, etc) businesses, which the RBI has, in its wisdom, resolutely resisted, and I really hope they continue to do so..

In addition, our stock exchange margining system and transaction settlement system worked even better than in the US in containing huge negative exposures of individual players, mainly because algorithmic trading (which can very rapidly put through transactions involving mind-boggling amounts) was not permitted in India. Now algorithmic trading is permitted, and probably accounts for about 20% of all trades today. This percentage is set to zoom, giving traders with access to this technology a huge edge, and reducing retail investors to mere peripheral price takers. Given that our markets still do not have depth comparable to the first world exchanges, a runaway rogue trading program has the potential of putting almost the entire exchange settlement and margining system at risk, leading to a possible rapid stock market crash or boom. 

I hope I am wrong.  

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LIC to set up bank: Nothing more foolhardy!

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The recent news item to the effect that LIC wants to set up a bank flies in the face of basic financial prudence and wisdom that has been reinforced by recent events in the world.Let's briefly see why this is so.

A bank lends illiquid (its loans are invested in illiquid assets like property, stocks and receivables of its borrowers) and borrows liquid (its deposits have to be repaid anytime the depositor asks for it). Hence, the major raison d'etre of a bank is managing mismatched liquidity. This is impossible in times of financial uncertainty, and if the bank loses depositors' trust. At such time, the liquidity gap forces the bank into bankruptcy unless it is rescued by the central bank. 

An insurance company is very liquid in good times, indeed, awash in liquidity. When catastrophe strikes, this liquidity is drawn on suddenly. An insurance company manages this huge risk primarily by dissipating the risk over a large number of lives or properties as the case may be, in its areas of operation; and distributing the residual risk globally through reinsurance. Hence, the raison d'etre of an insurance company is to be liquid when nobody else is. 

We have seen that extreme financial risks do not conform to the normal distribution, and that the distribution they conform to have "fat tails". Hence, we now know that banks are more vulnerable to financial crises than believed before Bear Stearns' demise in 2007.  

We have also seen that natural catastrophes of all kinds have increased significantly (maybe because of climate change effect). For example, the two deadliest earthquakes in recorded history have happened in the last two years itself (Sumatra, Chile). If we go back 10 years, a blip on the cosmic clock, we find many more unusual natural disasters like flash floods in Oman (a desert!), raging forest fires in Indonesia, Australia and the US, and many others. Further, a major earthquake is overdue in California. Hence, we can say that there is a heightened expectation of exposure to catastrophes and claims for the insurance industry worldwide.

Today, banking and insurance are unarguably the riskiest businesses globally. We have seen the wisdom of RBI's not allowing banks to become exposed to toxic derivative securities.  We have also seen the foolhardiness (it seems in hindsight)  of AIG taking on unmeasured risks of the banking industry by insuring bonds. 

It simply is foolhardy to potentially commit the liquidity of India's most liquid entity in the riskiest industry by allowing it to diversify into an industry that has been shown to be almost as risky as the insurance business.
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Bizarre Bank

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Have you ever known a bank 

• whose Chairman and Executive Directors never attended any Board Meeting, yet signed its minutes?
• whose Chief Executive's authorisation of transactions was done from another country by someone else, using "pcAnywhere" software?
• whose Chairman apparently signed the Annual Report when he was in the ICU in a different continent?
• whose borrowers denied having ever applied for, or having been given, loans though the books showed loans made exceeding $2Bn?

If you haven't, this story in The Economist will describe one such bank which has just recently gone into administration. Bizarre is the only word to describe this fraud.

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Who says the recession is over for the US?

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The Wall Street Journal reported on 24 Nov, 2009, that one in four homeowners in the US is “underwater” – meaning that they owe more on their mortgages than their home is worth.

A full 40% of those who took a home loan in 2006 are underwater, according to this report.

Douglas McIntyre, an editor at 24/7 Wall Street writes, “The news about underwater real estate is nearly as bad for banks as it is for homeowners. Default rates and foreclosures will almost certainly continue to rise. Banks will end up owning more and more properties that they are ill suited to sell. Many of those homes will be auctioned off at a fraction of what their values were two or three years ago.”

Who's saying that the worst of the recession is over for the US?

Anybody who understands human behaviour will also understand that it does not make a difference to a person under 7 feet of water to be under 9 feet, or for that matter, 25 feet of water. Enough of those borrowers, following this dictum, would have tanked up on personal loans, credit card debt and any other form of borrowing.

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Nothing's changed!

See the 2008 story of Andrew Hall's compensation here. And another story. 


He indicated that he would  move back to his roots -- UK -- if he does not get his dues, because the whole of America is balking at paying his eye-popping profit-share in commodities trading. So guess what, Citi has sold off Phibro rather than handle the controversy and embarrassment of paying him $100Mn when they still haven't repaid the Government bailout money. Now, Occidental Petroleum, the buyer, will have to handle the embarrassment. He's that valuable!  Is he, really?? 


True, his bets have gone right much more than they have gone wrong. What if they had failed? Would his employer be able to claw back the losses from his past pay? 


The inability to rein in "star traders" such as Hall  and "star-CEOs" is one of the biggest continuing governance failures that the developed world has still to get its hands around. 

My articles in Business Line Opinion Page

On this post, you will see links to my Opinion Page pieces published in Business Line. Three Finance articles were written through 2008 even as the unprecedented banking crisis in the US and the rest of the world developed. As we know now, the crisis rapidly grew into a global recession.

The links to the individual articles are given below:

Credit market crisis — Lessons that the West can learn from India (June 25, 2008)
Moral hazard and its harmful role in credit market crisis (July 23, 2008)

Is the ‘rescue plan’ the best there is? (October 3, 2008)

Credit Default Swaps should not be banned, says the Economist

It makes a case for modifying how CDS work, and say that
"CDSs have their uses. There is no reason why investors should not speculate in corporate debt if they can speculate on equities, currencies, commodities and the rest."

Famous last words, don't you think?